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This article examines the prospects for victim redress for the corporate commission
of foreign corruption, using Canada as a case study. Such cases are typically
addressed by negotiated settlements, with Canada’s new “remediation agreement”
regime embracing an intention to provide “reparations for harm done to victims or
to the community.” Further work, however, needs to be done on dening who is a
victim, with the SNC-Lavalin affair having focussed much attention on employees,
pensioners and shareholders, with barely a mention of the overseas victims of the
alleged crimes. To this end, the article examines comparable efforts undertaken
in England to ensure the interests of the overseas victims of economic crime are
taken into account. The creation of a fund to which the nancial penalties for foreign
corruption could be directed to support the provision of development assistance to
affected foreign countries is also considered.
Dans le présent article, nous examinons les perspectives de réparation pour
les victimes de corruption commise par les entreprises à l’étranger, en utilisant
le Canada comme étude de cas. De tels cas sont généralement réglés par
des accords négociés, le nouveau régime canadien d’« accord de réparation »
prévoyant de fournir « des réparations pour les dommages causés aux victimes
ou à la communauté ». D’autres travaux sont cependant nécessaires pour dénir
qui est une victime, l’affaire SNC-Lavalin ayant beaucoup attiré l’attention sur
les employés, les retraités et les actionnaires, avec à peine une mention des
victimes étrangères des crimes présumés. À cette n, l’article examine les efforts
comparables entrepris en Angleterre pour garantir la prise en compte des intérêts
des victimes étrangères de la criminalité économique. La création d’un fonds
dans lequel les sanctions nancières pour corruption étrangère pourraient être
versées dans le but de soutenir la fourniture d’une aide au développement aux
pays étrangers touchés est également envisagée.

*
Professor and Eldon Foote Chair in International Business and Law, Faculty of Law, University
of Alberta, Canada. Email: joanna.harrington@ualberta.ca. Earlier versions of this work benetted
greatly from feedback received at conferences in Florence, Italy, 20–21 June 2019; London, Ontario,
21 September 2019; and Tel Aviv, Israel, 16 December 2019. Special thanks are owed to Cameron
Jefferies, Ina Kubbe, Steven Penney, Cecily Rose and Dana Pugach for their engagement with parts of
this work, and to law students Kira Davidson and Megan Ferguson for research assistance. Financial
support for this work was provided by the University of Alberta’s Endowment Fund for the Future /
Support for the Advancement of Scholarship (EFF/SAS) Fund and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada.

246 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Prologue
Introduction
I. The Canadian legislative scheme to address foreign corruption
1. The Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act
2. Canada’s record of enforcement under the CFPOA
3. The remediation agreement provisions in the Criminal Code
4. Providing for victims in Canadian criminal law
II. The inevitability of economic consequences and shareholders as
victims
III. Comparative experience from the United Kingdom and Australia
IV. Creating a remediation fund similar to the Environmental Damages
Fund
Conclusion

Prologue
In early 2019, an alleged case of corporate fraud and foreign corruption
underpinned a widely-reported political scandal in Canada that led to the
resignations of a former minister of justice and attorney general of Canada
(then serving as veterans minister), the president of the treasury board, the
prime minister’s principal secretary, and Canada’s top civil servant, the
clerk of the privy council and secretary to the Cabinet.1 That same criminal
case also featured prominently in an inquiry conducted by the federal
conict of interest and ethics commissioner, who found that the prime
minister had used his position of authority to seek to inuence the attorney
general to further the interests of the corporation involved.2 The scandal
1.
For the media article that rst broke the story of the scandal, see Robert Fife, Steven Chase &
Sean Fine, “PMO Pressed Wilson-Raybould to Abandon Prosecution of SNC-Lavalin; Trudeau Denies
His Ofce ‘Directed’ Her,” The Globe and Mail (7 February 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com> [perma.cc/N7Q6-ABQU]. Among subsequent coverage, see Globe Staff and the Canadian Press,
“Timeline: A Chronicle of SNC-Lavalin, Trudeau, the PMO and Jody Wilson-Raybould,” The Globe
and Mail (12 February 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/3DPC-8V9J]. On the
resignations, see The Canadian Press, “Jody Wilson-Raybould Resigns from Cabinet,” Maclean’s
(12 February 2019), online: <www.macleans.ca> [perma.cc/A9KZ-RH98]; John Paul Tasker, “Gerald
Butts Resigns as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Principal Secretary,” CBC News (18 February
2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/QRL8-48Z4]; Kathleen Harris, “Jane Philpott Resigns from
Cabinet, Citing Loss of ‘Condence’ over Government’s Handling of SNC-Lavalin,” CBC News
(4 March 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/J6FD-FQW9]; Campbell Clark, “Wernick’s Sudden
Resignation is a Reminder of SNC Affair, Not a Quick Fix,” The Globe and Mail (19 March 2019) A8.
2.
Canada, Ofce of the Conict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Trudeau II Report, by Mario
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continued to resonate during the national election of October 2019, with
the former attorney general who had complained of political interference
by the prime minister winning re-election to serve as the sole independent
member of parliament.3
At the heart of the scandal was the Quebec-based multinational
engineering and construction giant, the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., with a
global workforce of thousands. Widely admired as a crown jewel of the
Quebec corporate world, SNC-Lavalin faced criminal charges throughout
most of 2019 arising from activities undertaken in Libya from 2001 until
its civil war in 2011.4 Specically, on 19 February 2015, the company and
two of its afliates were charged with one count of foreign bribery and
one count of fraud arising from the alleged payment of CAD $47.7 million
in bribes to one or more public ofcials in Libya and the defrauding of
several Libyan organizations of almost CAD $130-million.5 It later became
known that the alleged bribes were paid to Saadi Gadda, the third son of
the notorious Libyan ruler Muammar Gadda, using funds arising from
the construction contracts he helped to secure for SNC-Lavalin in Libya.6
The SNC-Lavalin Group, however, professed its innocence, taking the
position that the charges concerned the “reprehensible deeds by former
employees who left the company long ago.”7 Indeed, three years earlier,
in February 2012, several SNC-Lavalin executives had left their positions
amidst controversy,8 with one of these individuals later pleading guilty
to Swiss charges of bribery, money laundering and corruption arising

Dion (Ottawa: OCIEC, 2019) [Trudeau II Report].
3.
Nancy MacDonald & Andrea Woo, “Federal Election 2019: Jody Wilson-Raybould Wins Seat
in Vancouver Granville, Will Serve as Lone Independent in Parliament,” The Globe and Mail (22
October 2019), online: <www.https://theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/NR9D-Z68D].
4.
There were also allegations that SNC-Lavalin had been engaged in corrupt activities elsewhere,
including in Canada with regards to the securing of a construction contract for a large hospital complex
in Montreal. See, e.g., “Former SNC-Lavalin CEO Pleads Guilty in Superhospital Fraud Case,” CBC
News (1 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/P5RP-396Y].
5.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, News Release, “RCMP Charges SNC-Lavalin” (19 February
2015) (no longer available online; on le with the author).
6.
SNC-Lavalin would later unsuccessfully challenge the prosecution’s position that Saadi Gadda
was a foreign public ofcial at a preliminary inquiry: R c SNC-Lavalin International Inc, 2019 QCCQ
7778.
7.
SNC-Lavalin, Press Release, “SNC-Lavalin Contests the Federal Charges by the Public
Prosecution Service of Canada and Will Enter a Non-Guilty Plea,” (19 February 2015), online: SNCLavalin <www.snclavalin.com> [perma.cc/68XQ-T9CB]. SNC–Lavalin’s position was also reected
in media reports. See, e.g., Graeme Hamilton, “SNC-Lavalin Charged with Fraud, Bribery: Charges
Stem from Libya Deals,” National Post (20 February 2015) FP1.
8.
See, e.g., The Canadian Press, “SNC-Lavalin Gadda Controversy: Riadh Ben Aïssa, Stéphane
Roy Dismissed Amid Mexico Smuggling Allegations,” Hufngton Post (10 February 2012), online:
<www.hufngtonpost.ca> [perma.cc/9FKY-69RE].
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from activities in Libya.9 (A Swiss connection arose from the location of
where the transfers of funds were made to execute the Libyan scheme.)
The Swiss plea bargain also resulted in some of the monies being returned
to SNC-Lavalin in recognition of its status as an injured party and victim
of the individual’s crimes.10 Some, however, have proffered a competing
narrative, suggesting that the executives red in 2012 served as cover
or “scapegoats” for a company so then mired in corruption that it had
encouraged its employees to do everything necessary to obtain a lucrative
contract.11
Notwithstanding its protestations of innocence, it was also no secret
that SNC-Lavalin had long been keen to secure some form of negotiated
solution, with the charges having come about after settlement talks had
failed.12 The company made known it was open to discussing alternative
forms of resolution, noting in its press release of 25 February 2015 “that
companies in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom, benet from a different approach that has been effectively
used in the public interest to resolve similar matters.”13 At that time,
Canadian law did not permit this “different approach,” but with a change
in government in October 2015, an opportunity arose for SNC-Lavalin
to lobby a new administration in Ottawa for changes to be made to the
sentencing options provided by Canada’s Criminal Code.14 The saving
9.
Dave Seglins, “Riadh Ben Aïssa, ex-SNC-Lavalin Executive, Agrees to Settlement Plan,”
CBC News (18 August 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/HM2Q-4794]; Nicolas Van Praet &
Graeme Hamilton, “Ex-SNC Executive Guilty: Libyan Fixer Faces Justice,” National Post (2 October
2014) A1-A2. Upon his release from a Swiss jail, Aïssa was extradited to Canada on corruption and
fraud charges concerning the construction of a Montreal hospital complex and later pleaded guilty
to a lesser charge: Jesse Feith, “Ex-SNC-Lavalin Vice-President Pleads Guilty to Charge in MUHC
Superhospital Scandal,” Montreal Gazette (11 July 2018) A6. See also Ben Aïssa c Groupe SNCLavalin Inc, 2019 QCCA 964. Later, Ben Aïssa’s predecessor in charge of SNC-Lavalin’s international
construction division, Sami Bebawi, was found guilty of corruption offences relating to Libya:
Jonathan Montpetit, “Former SNC-Lavalin Executive Found Guilty on Libya Corruption Charges,”
CBC News (15 December 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/SW4Q-V9K2]. The charges
against the division’s former comptroller, Stéphane Roy, were stayed on grounds of unreasonable
delay: Giuseppe Valiante, “Case Thrown Out against Former SNC-Lavalin Exec,” CBC News (19
February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/2XG7-HJ8K]. See also Roy c SNC-Lavalin Inc,
2016 QCCS 836.
10. Van Praet & Hamilton, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Sophie Cousineau & Greg McArthur, “Fired Executive Sues SNC-Lavalin, Says
He Always Acted on ‘Orders,’” The Globe and Mail (13 February 2013), online <www.https://
theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/PFT6-2HRS].
12. See, e.g., Les Perreaux, Jeff Gray & Bertrand Marotte, “SNC-Lavalin charged with Fraud,
Bribery after Settlement Talks Fail,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto) (20 February 2015) A1.
13. SNC-Lavalin Press Release of 19 February 2015, supra note 7.
14. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at paras 24-27. See also David Cochrane, “Inside SNC-Lavalin’s
Long Lobbying Campaign to Change the Sentencing Rules,” CBC News (14 February 2019), online:
<www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/Z58U-PRZB]; Nick Taylor-Vaisey, “Where SNC-Lavalin’s Push for
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of jobs was pitched as the key public interest at stake, with the criminal
prosecution of a corporate giant such as SNC-Lavalin being portrayed as
having serious negative collateral consequences for employees, pensioners
and shareholders, given that a conviction for foreign bribery would debar
the company from bidding on future work both in Canada and elsewhere.15
By September 2018, Canadian law had indeed been amended so as to
permit what are known elsewhere as “deferred prosecution agreements”
(DPAs), but under Canadian law are to be called remediation agreements,
or accords de réparation in French.16 Court records indicate that SNCLavalin made overtures to the director of public prosecutions for such an
agreement, both before the new law had entered into force and after,17 and
to this end, the company provided an extensive amount of information on
its efforts since 2012 to undertake signicant internal change, including the
implementation of an internal ethics and compliance program, with anticorruption training for all employees.18 The director, however, declined
to issue SNC-Lavalin the required invitation to negotiate a remediation
agreement on the grounds that it was “not appropriate in this case,”19 leading
to pressure from the prime minister on the attorney general to intervene.
The prime minister was later found by Canada’s ethics commissioner in
August 2019 to have acted contrary to the constitutional principles of
prosecutorial independence and the rule of law.20
Four months later, a deal was reached. On 18 December 2019, the
Court of Quebec accepted a plea of guilty to a single charge of fraud from
Deferred Prosecution Came Up Short,” Maclean’s (22 February 2019), online: <www.macleans.ca>
[perma.cc/LK96-GHQD].
15. Within Quebec, the Integrity in Public Contracts Act, SQ 2012, c 25, subjects commercial
enterprises to a screening and authorization process to determine eligibility for contracts with public
bodies. Federally, the Government of Canada uses a policy, rather than statutory, approach to provide
for a ten-year debarment period upon conviction for foreign bribery: Government of Canada, Public
Services and Procurement Canada, Ineligibility and Suspension Policy, last modied 14 July 2017,
online: <https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ci-if/politique-policy-eng.html> [perma.cc/B2GA-7MMU].
In addition, as conrmed before a recent inquiry into the effectiveness of the UK’s anti-bribery law,
“many countries have laws which debar a convicted company from public procurement contracts,
and still more countries have laws allowing discretionary debarment”: UK, House of Lords, Select
Committee on the Bribery Act 2010, The Bribery Act 2010: Post-legislative Scrutiny (HL Paper 303)
(March 2019), at para 248, online: <www.publications.parliament.uk> [perma.cc/562Z-L6SE].
16. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, Part XXII.1 (“Remediation Agreements”) [Criminal
Code]. Enacted as Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No 1, SC 2018, c 12, s 404, the amendments were
included within Bill C-74, An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament
on February 27, 2018 and Other Measures (assented to on 21 June 2018, the new provisions entered
into force on 19 September 2018) [Bill C-74].
17. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc v Canada (Public Prosecution Service), 2019 FC 282 at para 12 [SNCLavalin v Canada 2019].
18. Ibid at para 13.
19. Ibid at paras 21, 24.
20. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 351.
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the subsidiary SNC–Lavalin Construction Inc., with a ne in the amount
of CAD $280-million to be paid in equal instalments over the next ve
years. In return, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada withdrew all
charges against the parent company, the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., as
well as its international marketing arm, SNC-Lavalin International Inc.,
with SNC-Lavalin agreeing to a term of probation and the engagement of
an independent monitor for its compliance with international standards.
In essence, SNC-Lavalin had secured what it had wanted all along.21 A
subsidiary that had not been active since 2015 was found to have defrauded
the government of Libya, and thus its people, of millions, but the parent
company, as it stated in its press release concerning the plea deal, did
“not anticipate that the guilty plea by a construction subsidiary…will
affect the eligibility of SNC-Lavalin Group companies to bid on future
projects….”22 The withdrawal of the corruption of a foreign public ofcial
charge had removed the risk of debarment from future government
contracts.
Introduction
Clearly, the SNC-Lavalin affair raises many issues of both law and politics.
These include the openness of a prime minister and the minister of nance
to the lobbying efforts of a corporation then facing criminal charges and
the reality of some collateral economic impact to ow with any criminal
prosecution of a large corporation, alongside important questions of
corporate ethics and international business standards. Questions were
also asked about whether to split the roles of the attorney general and
the minister of justice to further protect prosecutorial independence,23 and
the appropriateness of former Supreme Court of Canada justices acting
as counsel in contentious cases.24 But lost amidst all these discussions
have been the corruption’s overseas victims, with the word “Libya” not
mentioned even once in the ethics commissioner’s report. This article
21. A point not missed by media commentators: Peter Zimonjic, “After Year of Political Turmoil,
SNC-Lavalin Gets Most of What It Wanted in Plea Deal,” CBC News (18 December 2019), online:
<www.cbc.ca> [perma.cc/DCM9-AJPF].
22. SNC-Lavalin, Press Release, “SNC–Lavalin Group Settles Federal Charges” (18 December
2019), online: SNC-Lavalin <https://www.snclavalin.com/en/media/press-releases/2019/18-12-2019>
[perma.cc/3YJM-WU74]. See also Kamila Hinkson, “SNC-Lavalin pleads guilty to fraud for past
work in Libya, will pay $280M ne,” CBC News (18 December 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca> [perma.
cc/L984-DWQ2].
23. See further A Anne McLellan, Review of the Roles of the Minister of Justice and the Attorney
General of Canada (Ottawa: Ofce of the Prime Minister of Canada, 28 June 2019), online: <www.
pm.gc.ca> [perma.cc/GGP8-J3LB] (made public after the release of the Trudeau II Report, supra note
2, on 14 August 2019).
24. See further Shannon Proudfoot, “Talk to my Former Supreme Court Judge,” Maclean’s (3 April
2019), online: <www.macleans.ca> [perma.cc/RB5S-FA3B].
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addresses this failing by using the SNC-Lavalin affair as a springboard for
discussing the means for securing a fuller measure of accountability for the
corporate commission of serious economic crimes, while also highlighting
a need for greater clarity in the law as to who is to be considered a victim.
While recognizing the taint now associated with negotiated deals as a
result of SNC-Lavalin’s lobbying in its own self-interest, I nevertheless
argue that the exibility afforded by negotiated settlements with corporate
defendants provides the best prospects for securing some form of nancial
consideration for the victims of complex economic crime.
Victimhood has received much coverage throughout the SNC-Lavalin
affair. The term victim was used to describe the employees, pensioners,
shareholders and suppliers of SNC-Lavalin, although it is not so clear
that they were directly victimized by the fraud and bribery. Many also
made use of the phrase “innocent third parties” as a way of recognizing
the collateral impact of a corporate prosecution,25 with none other than the
deputy minister of justice and deputy attorney general of Canada using a
combination of the terms by referring to the pensioners of SNC-Lavalin as
“innocent victims.”26 It can be argued, however, that pensioners are victims
because of the failings of successive governments to require corporations
to set aside funds to meet their pension commitments and to ensure a
super-priority to pensioners in the event of a corporate bankruptcy, rather
than being the victims of the fraud or bribery, or the victims of a criminal
prosecution to enforce the law concerning fraud or bribery. On the other
hand, many pension funds are shareholders, with the deputy minister of
justice having oddly referred to “small shareholders,” alongside employees
and pensioners, as “innocent victims and third parties.”27 There were,
however, other victims of the fraud and bribery that went unmentioned,
including the competitor companies and their employees, whether in
Canada or abroad, who lost out on work because of another’s use of
bribery, and the organizations in Libya that were defrauded of millions.
Society as a whole is also a victim. Indeed, the use of a criminal law
approach, as distinct from a corporate ethics approach, to address the
problem of corruption in international business transactions embraces an
underlying assumption that corruption is neither victimless nor harmless.
The harm arises when corruption siphons funds from government accounts
that could have been used for the provision of public services, with Canadian
25. See, e.g., House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence,
42-1, No 132 (21 February 2019) at 1125 (Hon David Lametti).
26. As recorded in Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 114.
27. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 132
(21 February 2019) at 1125 (Nathalie Drouin).
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courts having taken the view that “a fraud against a government agency is
not a victimless crime in that it results in a reduction in resources available
to people who rely on government services.”28 Our courts have also said
that “[a]ll Canadians, and our society as a whole, are victims when public
ofcials breach the trust placed in them.”29 Similar sentiments have also
been expressed with respect to foreign corruption by the Supreme Court
of Canada. In a 2016 case, coincidentally arising from allegations that
SNC-Lavalin had engaged in bribery to secure a contract in Bangladesh,
the court wrote: “Corruption is a signicant obstacle to international
development. It undermines condence in public institutions, diverts
funds from those who are in great need of nancial support, and violates
business integrity.”30 Yet questions remain as to how to provide for some
form of victim redress in the foreign corruption context, even though the
prospect for “reparations for harm done to victims or to the community”
has long been recognized as a Canadian sentencing principle.31
To this end, this article is organized into four parts. In Part I, I provide
an overview of the Canadian legislative scheme for addressing foreign
corruption, making note of both its international impetus in 1998 and its
substantive amendment in 2013. I also discuss the 2018 addition of the
provisions on remediation agreements, and I discuss the denition of a
victim in Canadian criminal law. In Part II, I recognize the inevitably of
a nancial penalty causing some economic impact in corporate cases of
foreign corruption, but I question the idea of shareholders as victims. I
use the Canadian case of Grifths Energy International as an illustrative
example, with the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Ofce later seizing
and redirecting the benets from bribery that went to a shareholder so as to
provide assistance to the crime’s overseas victims. In Part III, I review the
potential inuence of comparable developments elsewhere, and in Part IV,
I mention the use of creative sentencing arrangements in environmental
law in a way that provides funding for projects of assistance to victims in
the broadest sense of the word, using Canada’s Environmental Damages
Fund as a model. I conclude that the best prospects for victim redress for
corporate criminality in foreign corruption cases lie with the diversion of
some portion of the nancial penalty incurred so as to support the funding
of development assistance projects.
28. R v Karigar, 2014 ONSC 3093 at para 24 (citing R v Bogart, [2002] 61 OR (3d) 75 at para 33,
leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2002] SCCA 398).
29. R v Karigar, supra note 28 at para 34 (citing R v Serré, 2013 ONSC 1732 at para 29).
30. World Bank Group v Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 at para 1.
31. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 718(e), repeated specically for remediation agreements in s
715.31(e).
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The Canadian legislative scheme to address foreign corruption

1. The Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act
Motivated by the desire to establish a global set of rules applicable to all,
there are now several international treaties requiring parties to have in
place domestic anti-bribery and corruption laws. These treaties, and the
domestic laws they have encouraged, make use of a criminal law approach
to address what may once have been seen as a problem of business ethics,
with bribery having become the standard offence for addressing acts of
foreign corruption committed to obtain an undue advantage in international
business.32 For Canada, the lead treaty is the 1997 Convention on
Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Ofcials in International Business
Transactions,33 developed by states under the auspices of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but inspired by the
1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).34 Canada is also bound
by the 1996 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption35 and the
2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption.36 Canada’s treaty
obligations are then transformed into domestic law through domestic
legislation, most notably the 1998 Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials
Act (or CFPOA),37 but also the Criminal Code.38
As discussed in detail elsewhere,39 the enactment in Canada of the
CFPOA took an unusual path, with its speedy passage meaning that
there is little on record to address current questions of concern, such
as the denition of victim. Although there was clearly no emergency,
the proposed legislation came forth as a fast-tracked initiative with allparty support, and sailed through the required phases of consideration in
both houses of parliament within a week. The explanation for the law’s
speedy passage rests with its international impetus and a domestic desire
to matter. At a summit meeting in May 1998, states within the Group of

32. See, e.g., T Markus Funk & Andrew S Boutros, eds, From Baksheesh to Bribery: Understanding
the Global Fight Against Corruption and Graft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
33. 17 December 1997, OECD Doc DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 ILM 1 (1998) (entered into force 15
February 1999) [OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
34. Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1496 (1977), codied and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq.
35. 29 March 1996, OASTS No B-58 (entered into force 6 March 1997, ratication by Canada on 1
June 2000).
36. 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force 14 December 2005, ratication by Canada
on 2 October 2007).
37. Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act, SC 1998, c 34 [CFPOA].
38. See, e.g., An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in order to implement the United Nations
Convention against Corruption, SC 2007, c 13.
39. See generally Joanna Harrington, “Addressing the Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials:
Developments and Challenges within the Canadian Legal Landscape” (2018) 56 Can YB Intl L 98.
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8 (G8)40 made a public commitment to ratify the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention before the end of 1998.41 As time passed, Canada recognized
that its ratication would be the one that would bring the convention into
force, with the then minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, describing
Canadian ratication as “the key which will unlock the door.”42 This led
to a rushed approach. Parliament nalized its enactment of the CFPOA
on 10 December 1998, enabling the executive branch to ratify the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention on 17 December 1998, and the CFPOA was later
brought into force by cabinet on 14 February 1999,43 a day before the
convention entered into force internationally.
As the implementation vehicle for Canada’s international obligations,
the CFPOA makes the bribery of a foreign public ofcial to obtain or
retain an advantage in the course of business an indictable offence under
Canadian law. Offering a bribe, however, is not the only offence of
relevance, with the possession of property, or the proceeds of property,
obtained through foreign bribery, and the laundering of such property or
proceeds, also constituting offences under Canadian law.44 Canadian law
also enables the prosecution of a conspiracy or an attempt to commit these
offences, and also applies to situations of aiding and abetting.
In keeping with the imperatives of article 2 of the OECD AntiBribery Convention, both individuals and corporations, without regard
to nationality, may be charged in Canada with foreign corruption. The
word “person” is used in the CFPOA so as to include corporations, using
the same principles of corporate criminal liability as apply to Criminal
Code offences.45 Enforcement of the law for corporations is by ne, with
the department of justice having explained in 1999 that: “Corporations,
40. First formed in 1975 to discuss matters of mutual concern, the G8 is now, once again, the Group
of Seven (G7), with Russia having been ejected following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Canada
joined the G7 in 1976.
41. G8 Birmingham Summit, Final Communiqué (17 May 1998) at para 7, online: G7 Information
Centre <https://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/nalcom.htm> [perma.cc/ZX85XBWJ].
42. Debates of the Senate, 36-1, vol 137, No 100 (3 December 1998) at 1530 (Hon Lloyd Axworthy).
The convention’s entry into force was dependent on securing ratication from at least ve of the top
ten trading countries in the OECD.
43. Order Fixing February 14, 1999 as the Date of the Coming into Force of the Act, SI/99-13.
44. CFPOA, supra note 37, ss 4-7. These CFPOA provisions were later repealed, along with similar
provisions in other federal statutes, so as to require the use of the Criminal Code’s provisions on
possession and laundering, rather than having individualized provisions in various federal statutes: An
Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Law Enforcement) and to Make Consequential
Amendments to Other Acts, SC 2001, c 32, s 58.
45. Section 2 of the CFPOA, supra note 37, denes “person” to mean a person as dened in section
2 of the Criminal Code, supra note 16, which makes clear that references to “person” include an
organization and that “organization means (a) a…body corporate.”
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of course, cannot be subject to imprisonment, but they can be ned. The
amount of any ne would be at the discretion of the judge, and there is no
maximum.”46
During the Act’s passage, Canadian parliamentarians focussed their
discussions on the often stated goal of securing a level playing eld for
Canadian businesses operating abroad. Only passing reference was made
to corruption’s corrosive effects on democracy, human rights and the rule
of law, and there was no discussion of the place for victims within the
new legislative scheme. It was assumed that there would be victims if the
prohibited conduct took place, but no-one asked about how to identify
or dene these victims, nor was there any discussion on how to ensure
that any recovered property or proceeds of crime would be used to assist
the victims, assuming that an adequate means of identication could be
worked out. Victim redress was simply not discussed.
When the Act underwent amendment in 2013,47 the then minister of
foreign affairs, John Baird, expressly recognized that: “Every dollar that
goes to a bribe is a dollar that does not benet the people who desperately
need a new school, or a new hospital, or what have you.”48 But there was
little else said about how to remedy this situation by way of a successful
prosecution. Instead, the 2013 amendments aimed to “answer the call for
enhanced vigilance”49 by making certain improvements to the existing
scheme, rather than instigating any radical change. The maximum sentence
for individual offenders was increased from ve to fourteen years, a new
“books-and-records” offence specic to foreign bribery was created, and
the reach of the Act was extended to assert Canadian jurisdiction on the
basis of both nationality and territory.50 The Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) was granted the exclusive authority to lay charges, thereby
eliminating any potential for overlap with provincial police forces. The
2013 changes also removed the defence to a foreign bribery charge for
what are known as “grease payments” or small “facilitation payments,”51

46. The Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act: A Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1999)
at 7.
47. Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, SC 2013, c 26 [FFCA].
48. “Bill S-14, An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act,” Senate, Standing
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence, 41-1, No 22 (28 February
2013) at 22:27 (Hon John Baird).
49. “Bill S-14, An Act to amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act,” House of Commons
Debates, 41-1, vol 146, No 255 (24 May 2013) at 1000 (Bob Dechert).
50. FFCA, supra note 47, ss 3, 4. See further Harrington, supra note 39 at 112-120.
51. FFCA, supra note 47, s 5.
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although this particular amendment did not come into force until 31
October 2017.52
2. Canada’s record of enforcement under the CFPOA
Yet, despite the stated desire for “enhanced vigilance,” it remains the
case that in twenty years, there were only six convictions under Canada’s
CFPOA. This record is a point of sensitivity for Canada’s diplomatic
relations with other states keen to secure the global deterrence of bribery
and corruption. Three of the six convictions concern corporations, secured
by way of a negotiated guilty plea,53 while the three individuals convicted
under the Act went to trial.54 This tally now increases to seven with the
recent conviction and sentencing of former SNC-Lavalin executive vicepresident Sami Bebawi for corruption activities involving Libya.55
Crimes of corruption, by their covert nature, are hard to prove and
little is said publicly by either the RCMP or the Canadian government as to
why there have been only seven convictions in twenty plus years. It may be
that other charges have been preferred, after a balancing of various factors,
as illustrated by the guilty plea to a single charge of fraud for an SNCLavalin construction subsidiary in December 2019.56 There may also be
active investigations underway, with the government taking the view that
“allegations of corruption…are…treated with the utmost condence for
reasons of privacy and ensuring the integrity of investigations.”57 A simple

52. Order Fixing October 31, 2017 as the Day on which Subsection 3(2) of the Act Comes into
Force, SI/2017-69, (2017) C Gaz II, 3233. See also Global Affairs Canada, News Release, “Canada
repeals facilitation payments exception in Corruption of Foreign Public Ofcials Act” (30 October
2017), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/10/
canada_repeals_facilitationpaymentsexceptionincorruptionofforeig.html> [perma.cc/29WF-MN55].
53. The leading case is R v Grifths Energy International Inc, [2013] AJ No 412 (QB), while the
other case of note is R v Niko Resources Ltd, [2011] AJ No 1586, 101 WCB (2d) 118 (Alta QB).
The third case involved charges against both an individual and a corporation but was resolved by a
negotiated guilty plea for the corporation: R v Watts and Hydro-Kleen Systems Inc, [2005] AJ No 568
(QB).
54. The leading case is R v Karigar, 2013 ONSC 5199, appeal from conviction dismissed 2017
ONCA 576, leave to appeal refused, [2017] SCCA 385 (concerning an attempt to bribe ofcials in
India to secure a software contract with Air India). Two other individuals involved were also convicted:
R v Barra and Govindia, 2019 ONSC 1786.
55. Jesse Feith, “SNC-Lavalin: Sami Bebawi Sentenced to 8½ Years for Fraud, Corruption,”
Montreal Gazette (11 January 2020), online: <www.https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/
snc-lavalin-sami-bebawi-sentenced-to-8-5-years-in-prison-for-fraud-corruption/> [perma.cc/85LAX3PP].
56. SNC-Lavalin Press Release of 18 December 2019, supra note 22.
57. An archive of annual reports to parliament can be found at: Global Affairs Canada, Bribery and
Corruption, online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topicsdomaines/other-autre/corruption.aspx?lang=eng> [perma.cc/X2LL-SD7J]. The number of active or
ongoing investigations used to be reported annually and publicly, as noted in Harrington, supra note
39 at 102.
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conviction tally also overlooks the fact that some Canadian investigations
may serve to support taking prosecutorial action elsewhere, with it possible
that the RCMP’s search of SNC-Lavalin’s Montreal headquarters in April
201258 provided some assistance in the Swiss proceedings against an SNCLavalin former executive that secured a guilty plea in 2014.59
Similarly, little is said about Canada’s record of acquittals and stayed
proceedings under the Act, with this tally being twice that recorded by the
OECD given the latter’s focus on acquittals.60 A fuller report of Canada’s
record of unsuccessful cases would have to include the charges against all
ve individuals alleged to have taken part in the foreign bribery scheme
concerning the Padma bridge construction project in Bangladesh,61 as
well as a sixth individual who was charged in 2016 for offering a bribe to
Thai ofcials,62 but for whom the charges were withdrawn in 2017.63 Of
the ve individuals charged in relation to the Bangladesh bridge project
—with this being the same project that led to SNC-Lavalin’s negotiated
ten-year debarment from bidding on World Bank projects64—two had
their charges withdrawn as the jurisdictional connection to Canada was
unsound, while the remaining three were acquitted for lack of evidence
after the trial judge excluded the wiretap evidence obtained by the RCMP
on the basis of an authorization that it had secured using information that
it had failed to verify.65
58. Paul Waldie, Ingrid Peritz & Graeme Smith, “RCMP Makes Second Search of SNC-Lavalin,”
The Globe and Mail (13 April 2012), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/rcmpmakes-second-search-of-snc-lavalin/article4100225/> [perma.cc/ME6H-DWTX]; “SNC-Lavalin’s
Montreal ofces Raided by RCMP,” CBC News (13 April 2012), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/snc-lavalin-s-montreal-ofces-raided-by-rcmp-1.1170982>
[perma.cc/7NAQPZS7].
59. Van Praet & Hamilton, supra note 9.
60. OECD Working Group on Bribery, 2018 Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention:
Investigations, Proceedings, and Sanctions (December 2019) at 2, online (pdf): <https://www.oecd.
org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Anti-Bribery-Convention-Enforcement-Data-2019.pdf> [perma.
cc/C6HR-7459].
61. Chowdhury v The Queen, 2014 ONSC 2635; R v Wallace, 2017 ONSC 0132.
62. “Canadian General Aircraft President Charged with Conspiring to Bribe Thai Ofcials in Plane
Deal,” CBC News (24 November 2016), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/rcmpbribery-larry-kushniruk-canadian-general-aircraft-thai-airways-1.3866073> [perma.cc/292X-K49Q].
63. Meghan Grant, “Charges Dropped against Calgary Man Accused of Conspiring to Bribe
Thai Ofcials in Jet Deal,” CBC News (6 December 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/calgary/rcmp-bribery-larry-kushniruk-canadian-general-aircraft-thai-airways-chargestayed-1.4436289> [perma.cc/5TGZ-UXT7].
64. The World Bank, Press Release, “World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin Inc. and its Afliates for
10 years” (17 April 2013), online: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/
world-bank-debars-snc-lavalin-inc-and-its-afliates-for-ten-years> [perma.cc/7TSL-ZQ42].
65. R v Wallace, 2017 ONSC 0132; See also Jacques Gallant, “Judge Acquits SNC-Lavalin Execs,
Say RCMP Relied on ‘Gossip,’” Toronto Star (10 February 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/
news/gta/2017/02/10/judge-acquits-snc-lavalin-execs-says-rcmp-relied-on-gossip.html> [perma.cc/
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3. The remediation agreement provisions in the Criminal Code
As for the sentencing options available for the corporate commission of
foreign corruption, Canada opted in 2018 to expand what was available
by adopting what some have pitched as a made-in-Canada version of a
deferred prosecution agreement regime. This regime was bolted on to both
the CFPOA and the Criminal Code, again through the speedy passage of
legislation by parliament. The new law enables prosecutors to negotiate
deferred prosecution agreements for certain specied criminal offences of
an economic character, including the bribing of a foreign public ofcial and
the maintenance or destruction of books and records to facilitate or hide
such a bribe.66 The new scheme aims to hold an organization accountable,
oblige the imposition of corrective measures, and encourage the voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing.67
In considering this change to the law, Canada engaged in a public
consultation process in the fall of 2017, resulting in feedback from
businesses, industry associations, justice sector stakeholders, nongovernmental organizations and academics.68 According to the
government’s summary of the results, published in February 2018, a
majority supported the change, viewing a deferred prosecution agreement
regime as “a useful additional tool for prosecutors to use at their discretion
in appropriate circumstances to address corporate wrongdoing.”69
Criticism later emerged that more time was needed to study the proposal.70
Nevertheless, ve days after the release of the consultation results, as noted
in the ethics commissioner’s report,71 the government of Canada introduced
legislation to amend the Criminal Code to provide for what would be
termed in Canadian law a “remediation agreement.” This terminology
presumably was chosen to convey the idea that these are tools “focused

WN7D-JTND].
66. Criminal Code, supra note 16, Schedule to Part XXII.1, s 2.
67. Ibid, ss 715.31(b)-(d).
68. See further Expanding Canada’s Toolkit to Address Corporate Wrongdoing: Discussion Paper
for Public Consultation: Deferred Prosecution Agreement Stream (Ottawa: Government of Canada,
2017) [2017 Discussion Paper]. See also Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at paras 34-35.
69. See Expanding Canada’s Toolkit to Address Corporate Wrongdoing: What We Heard (Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2018) at 4 [What We Heard]. See also Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para
40.
70. See Andy Blatchford, “Federal Budget Bill Quietly Proposes Tool to Ease Penalties for
Corporate Crime,” iPolitics (15 May 2018), online: <https://ipolitics.ca/2018/05/15/federal-budgetbill-quietly-proposes-tool-to-ease-penalties-for-corporate-crime/> [perma.cc/A8NL-NZ8P]. See also
John Geddes, “The Government’s Case for ‘Remediation Agreements’ Made no Mention of SNCLavalin,” Maclean’s (13 February 2019), online: <https://www.macleans.ca/politics/the-governmentscase-for-remediation-agreements-makes-no-mention-of-snc-lavalin/> [perma.cc/XVX8-QBYY].
71. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 41.
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on rehabilitation rather than on punishment.”72 The amendments were
included in a 582-page omnibus budget bill,73 sponsored by the minister of
nance, and as such, were not extensively debated by parliamentarians.74
Now found as Part XXII.1 of the Criminal Code, the new provisions
entered into force on 21 September 2018.75
As with the use of deferred prosecution agreements in the United
States and the jurisdiction of England and Wales,76 Canada’s regime for
remediation agreements offers an alternative to prosecution for corporations
willing to carry out certain specied obligations in return for a stay of
criminal charges. There is no legal right to a remediation agreement, with
their availability governed by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.77 An
over-arching public interest test governs the exercise of that discretion,78
taking into account such factors as the corporation’s self-reporting of
wrongdoing, the actions taken in response, and the culpability of senior
management, as well as any record of previous wrongdoing.79
For foreign corruption cases, the new provisions on remediation
agreements also make clear that “the prosecutor must not consider the
national economic interest, the potential effect on relations with a state other
than Canada or the identity of the organization or individual involved.”80
This prohibition is a verbatim copy of the pre-existing obligations of article
5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, with the bar on considering the
“national economic interest” prompting a debate in Canada throughout
much of 2019 as to whether this phrase can be interpreted in some way
so as to keep a large employer viable to save jobs and pensions.81 Indeed,
72. What We Heard, supra note 69 at 14.
73. See Bill C-74, supra note 16, which received First Reading in the House of Commons on 27
March 2018.
74. There are only four instances of discussion of the remediation agreements provisions in the
House of Commons and the Senate during the budget bill debates, with the most notable occurring
at a meeting of the former’s Standing Committee on Finance at which the lead civil servant with
responsibility for the proposed legislation provided an overview and answered questions: House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, 42-1, No 154 (8 May 2018) at 21:25 (Ann
Sheppard, Senior Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice) [Ann Sheppard
Committee Evidence].
75. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No 1, supra note 16, s 409.
76. Deferred prosecution agreements are not available in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
77. As conrmed in SNC-Lavalin v Canada 2019, supra note 17. See also Ann Sheppard Committee
Evidence, supra note 74.
78. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.32(1)(c).
79. Ibid, s 715.32(2).
80. Ibid, s 715.32(3).
81. See, in particular, Donald Johnston, “Was SNC-Lavalin Denied a Deal All Because of Three
Simple but Misunderstood Words,” Financial Post (22 March 2019), online: <https://business.
financialpost.com/opinion/was-snc-lavalin-denied-a-deal-all-because-of-three-simple-butmisunderstood-words> [perma.cc/8FRU-EJGK] (the author having served two terms as the OECD
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the former clerk to the privy council and secretary to the cabinet put
forward the view that the convention’s bar on “national economic interest”
considerations had an inter-state meaning such that “you cannot favour or
let a company off because it helps France versus Germany, or Germany
versus Italy, or Canada versus the United States,” but he maintained the
view that “[t]he [economic] impact on suppliers, pensioners, customers,
communities is a relevant public interest consideration.”82 It was later
reported by the ethics commissioner that the prime minister’s counsel had
argued that “the exclusion under the Criminal Code for considerations
of ‘national economic interest’ is not intended to apply to non-culpable
stakeholders,” but no supporting authority was referenced.83
And yet, the view of the OECD Working Group on Bribery is clear.
While the phrase “national economic interest” is not dened in the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, and the drafting history provides no assistance,84
the Working Group has advised that there are no permissible degrees
of economic interest which would justify inuencing a prosecutorial
decision.85 Indeed, Canada was told as much in 2004 when a Canadian
effort to distinguish “proper” from “improper” considerations of national
economic interest led the Working Group to recommend that Canada
“clarify that, in investigating and prosecuting the bribery of a foreign
public ofcial, there are no proper considerations of national economic
interest….”86 This recommendation was repeated again in a 2006 study
by the Working Group,87 wherein it was also accepted that “where large
secretary-general from 1996 to 2006); See also Jonathan Montpetit, “Why Quebec Sees SNC-Lavalin
as an Asset, not a Liability,” CBC News (14 February 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/snc-lavalin-quebec-prosecution-1.5018472> [perma.cc/4TAA-HHKK]; but see
Allan Lanthier, “The Inconvenient Reality: Economic Interest has Nothing to do with SNC-Lavalin
Getting a DPA,” The Globe and Mail (11 March 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
opinion/article-the-inconvenient-reality-economic-interest-has-nothing-to-do-with-snc/>
[perma.
cc/29WH-ZLYT]; See also the opinion of Kenneth Jull, counsel with Gardiner Roberts LLP: House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 133 (25 February
2019) at 17:10 (Kenneth Jull).
82. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 138
(6 March 2019) at 14:10 (Michael Wernick).
83. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 241, and for the ethics commissioner’s assessment, at
paras 308-319.
84. There is no formal drafting history or ofcial travaux préparatoires for the negotiations of the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Cecily Rose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: Their Creation
and Inuence on Domestic Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 41-42.
85. See generally Peter J Cullen & Mark Pieth, “Enforcement” in Mark Pieth, Lucinda A Low
& Nicola Bonucci, eds, The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary, 2nd ed (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 349-396, especially 370-380.
86. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Canada: Phase 2 (25 March 2004) at para 80, online (pdf):
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/31643002.pdf>
[perma.cc/ZQ8NQ8Z6].
87. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports (22 May 2006) at para
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companies are involved, enforcement actions…could potentially affect the
national economy of the relevant Parties.”88 Canada was reminded again
of the Working Group’s position in 2011,89 and it should have come as no
surprise that during the SNC-Lavalin affair, Canada was put on notice that
the Working Group was following the situation closely.90
It must also be emphasized that Canadian law clearly states that to
enter into negotiations for a remediation agreement, a prosecutor must be
of the opinion that there is a reasonable prospect of conviction with respect
to the offence.91 The negotiation of a remediation agreement also requires
the consent of the attorney general,92 and where negotiations result in an
agreement, judicial approval is then required,93 with a judge required to
consider if “the agreement is in the public interest” and whether its terms
are “fair, reasonable and proportionate to the gravity of the offence.”94
Remediation agreements are, therefore, not secret, behind-the-scenes,
out-of-court settlements, with the above requirements for independent
scrutiny serving to protect the public interest, although some worry that
these safeguards may deter corporate self-disclosure given the absence
of a guarantee in return.95 However, the new regime also presumes that
remediation agreements approved by a court will be made public,96 with
publication enabling “other companies to see the kinds of terms that
might be negotiated, if they were in a similar situation.”97 Publication and
transparency are also key factors in maintaining public condence in the
justice system.
As to their content, section 715.34(1) of the Criminal Code requires
a remediation agreement to include a statement of the relevant facts, an
admission of responsibility, and an indication of the penalty to be paid and
277, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/DN9Z-2SDP].
88. Ibid at para 284.
89. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention in Canada (18 March 2011) at paras 110-112, online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.
cc/5FKQ-7VMA].
90. OECD, “OECD will follow Canadian proceedings addressing allegations of political interference
in foreign bribery prosecution” (11 March 2019), online: <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/6KDA-6J9H].
91. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.32(1)(a).
92. Ibid at s 715.32(1)(d).
93. Ibid at s 715.37(1).
94. Ibid at s 715.37(6).
95. Provisions on the non-admissibility of certain admissions have been included to offset this
concern, but some may still worry that details once disclosed, cannot be taken back: Criminal Code,
supra note 16, ss 715.33(2), 715.34(2). The potential use in court of “deferred prosecution agreement
negotiation material” was expressly recognized as a “sensitive matter” in the government’s 2017
Discussion Paper, supra note 68 at 11.
96. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.42.
97. Ann Sheppard Committee Evidence, supra note 74 at 21:29.
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the forfeiture of any benet that was improperly received. A remediation
agreement also imposes ongoing reporting obligations, and it imposes
corporate obligations of cooperation and assistance with the aim of
supporting the investigation and prosecution of the individuals involved in
the crimes.98 A corporation may also be required to establish a compliance
plan to improve such matters as internal control procedures and employee
training, and in some cases, an independent monitor will be appointed to
report to the prosecutor on progress.99 If the corporation meets the terms
of the remediation agreement, the prosecutor will apply to a judge for
an order of successful completion.100 The charges will be stayed, and no
criminal conviction will result. But if the corporation breaches a term of the
remediation agreement, the criminal proceedings could be recommenced,
and a prosecution could take place,101 although provision is also made for
varying the terms of an approved remediation agreement.102
4. Providing for victims in Canadian criminal law
According to a purpose clause included within the new law, the
remediation agreements regime aims to “denounce” wrongdoing and
“provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community.”103 This
wording reects the existing content and phrasing of the key objectives
for sentencing those convicted of crimes already found in the Criminal
Code.104 However, while the purpose clause identies victim reparations
as an aim,105 it also provides that the law aims “to reduce the negative
consequences of the wrongdoing for persons—employees, customers,
pensioners and others—who did not engage in the wrongdoing.”106 This
emphasis on addressing the negative consequences for various third parties
was also highlighted by the government’s spokesperson in the Senate during
the law’s enactment, who emphasized that “[r]emediation agreements can
98. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.34(1)(d). Reecting on the American experience with
deferred prosecution agreements, the former US Attorney General Eric Holder has stated that “the
greatest deterrent effect is not to prosecute a corporation…[i]t is to prosecute the individuals in that
corporation that are responsible for those decisions,” as cited in Nicholas Ryder, “‘Too Scared to
Prosecute and Too Scared to Jail?’ A Critical and Comparative Analysis of Enforcement of Financial
Crime Legislation Against Corporations in the USA and the UK” (2018) 82:3 J Crim L 245 at 254.
According to one expert witness, cooperation to obtain a deferred prosecution agreement in the US
“entails providing human beings for the Government to prosecute”: UK Select Committee on the
Bribery Act, supra note 15 at 87.
99. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.34(3).
100. Ibid at s 715.4.
101. Ibid at s 715.39.
102. Ibid at s 715.38.
103. Ibid at s 715.31(a),(e).
104. Ibid at s 718(a), (e).
105. Ibid at s 715.31(e).
106. Ibid at s 715.31(f).
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save jobs, investment and a company’s contribution to our economy.”107
A backgrounder published by the federal department of justice when the
new law came into effect also draws attention to the “serious impact” of
economic crime “on the economy and on innocent third parties, such as
employees,”108 with the impact of a conviction on employees and others
having been raised by SNC-Lavalin in its judicial review application.109
However, not all would include investors or shareholders in the same
category as employees and pensioners, particularly if one takes the view
that those who benet from the risks of investing, should also shoulder
the burdens. Well-established legal scholars of corporate criminality have
written that “[j]ustice as fairness requires, as a minimum, that the cost
of corporate offences be internalised by the enterprise.”110 On the other
hand, it must be generally recognized that many pension funds are major
investors in publicly listed companies.
With respect to remedies, the new provisions expressly state that
remediation agreements may “provide reparations for harm done to
victims or the community,”111 with “victim” in the foreign corruption
context dened to include “any person outside Canada.”112 Indeed, victim
compensation is often cited as a key feature of deferred prosecution
agreement schemes, with those who comply being required to pay a form
of “anticipated restitution” in the absence of a formal conviction.113 This
language of restitution is required for jurisdictional reasons in Canada,
although it also leads to difculties. Within the Canadian federation,
criminal law is an area of jurisdiction for the Parliament of Canada,114
with the courts having held that this jurisdiction extends to include the
restitution of readily ascertainable losses following a conviction as part of
the sentencing process.115 The practical reality, however, of this situation
107. “Bill C-74, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on 27
February 2018 and other measures,” 2nd reading, Debates of the Senate, 42-1, No 218 (11 June 2018)
at 1830 (Grant Mitchell).
108. Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Media Release, “Remediation Agreements and
Orders to Address Corporate Crime: Backgrounder” (11 September 2018), online: <www.canada.ca>
[perma.cc/9GTV-L69P] [Department of Justice, “Backgrounder”].
109. SNC-Lavalin v Canada 2019, supra note 17 at paras 13, 31, 109.
110. See Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, “The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime:
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability” (1988) 11:3 Sydney L Rev 508, cited with approval
in CMV Clarkson, “Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls” (1996) 59:4 Modern L Rev
557 at 563.
111. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at ss 715.31(e), 715.32(2)(e), 715.34(1)(g).
112. Ibid at s 715.3(1).
113. 2017 Discussion Paper, supra note 68 at 12.
114. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(27), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II,
No 5.
115. R v Zelensky, [1978] 2 SCR 940, 86 DLR (3d) 179; see also Criminal Code, supra note 16 at ss
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is unsatisfactory as it seems illogical for victim compensation to be
available in the simple case of foreign bribery, but not in highly complex
cases involving carefully structured multijurisdictional layers of payments
and kickbacks. As for provincial (and territorial) efforts, there are various
forms of victims assistance schemes available, but none aim to provide
support or assistance for foreign victims of crime.
Canada’s statutory scheme for remediation agreements also makes
provision for victims’ rights to information and participation, with the
prosecutor under a duty to inform victims and their representatives soon
after an offer to negotiate a remediation agreement has been accepted by
the corporation.116 At the judicial approval stage, the court is also required
to consider any reparations made to victims and the content of any victim
or community impact statements,117 and if necessary, a judicially-approved
remediation agreement need not be published to protect the identity of
victims, among others.118 Provision is also made for the imposition of a
victim surcharge on top of the nancial penalty incurred,119 although to
whom these funds will benet in practice remains unclear. In the past,
sizeable victim surcharges have been paid by corporations in Canadian
foreign corruption cases ostensibly in support of victims’ assistance
programs,120 but without any mention of the foreign victims of the crimes.
In the Grifths Energy International case, involving a negotiated plea
deal to settle a charge of paying bribes to inuence the award of resource
development rights in Chad, the corporation involved paid a ne of CAD
$9 million and a victim surcharge of CAD $1.35 million.121 In the Niko
Resources case, involving a negotiated plea deal to settle a charge of paying
bribes to secure concessions in Bangladesh, the corporation paid a ne
738-741.2.
116. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 715.36. For conrmation of the policy intent, see House of
Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, 42-1, No 157 (23 May 2018) at 1615 (Ann
Sheppard).
117. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.37(3)(a), (c).
118. Ibid at s 715.42(3)(b).
119. Ibid at s 715.37(5). The amount of the victim surcharge is 30% “or any other percentage that the
prosecutor deems appropriate in the circumstances.”
120. Assessed at 15%, then later 30%, of any ne, the federal victim surcharge was introduced in 1989,
and made mandatory in 2013, as a way to make offenders more accountable and to offset some of the
costs of funding victims’ programs and services. However, in removing scope for judicial discretion to
alleviate the surcharge’s impact on offenders with no ability to pay, the government opened the door
to a constitutional challenge, with the victim surcharge law declared invalid in December 2018: R v
Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58.
121. Grifths Energy International, supra note 53 at paras 10, 28. See also Jen Gerson, “Guilty Plea
for Calgary Firm—Energy Company—Grifths Energy Paid Ofcials in Chad $2-million,” National
Post (Toronto edition) (23 January 2013) A4; Brian Hutchinson, “Law Firms Consulted Before $2M
Briber—Grifths Energy—Fined $10.3M After Admitting Illicit Payment,” National Post (Toronto
edition) (28 January 2013) A1-A2.
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of CAD $8.26 million and a victim surcharge of CAD $1.239 million.122
In both cases, the victim surcharge was payable to the Alberta treasury
without any mention of using these funds for victim assistance activities
of relevance to either Chad or Bangladesh. One is guessing, but perhaps
the reality of this situation is why the new provisions on remediation
agreements expressly state that the victim surcharge is not available for
offences under the CFPOA.123
There remains, however, further work to be done on dening a victim,
with clarity needed as to whether this categorization may also include a
company’s employees, pensioners and/or shareholders, or indeed, whether
the terminology of “victims” and “innocent third parties” that is found
within the law on remediation agreements might be interchangeable.
Within its consultation documents, the government acknowledged that
“in the case of economic crime, the ‘victim’ may not be an identiable
individual, but rather the employees, stakeholders of the company or
one of its competitors, or, in the case of foreign bribery, for example, the
citizens of another country.”124 However, the interests of the stakeholders
were clearly accorded greater weight, with the purpose of a remediation
agreement identied as being to “help to mitigate unintended consequences
associated with a criminal conviction for blameless employees, customers,
pensioners, suppliers and investors.”125 Indeed, it was expressly stated
within the response to the consultation that “[w]hile victim remediation was
considered to be a laudable goal, it was acknowledged that it is only viable
where the victims may be identied and the harm quantied.”126 A few
participants in the consultation also “indicated that victim compensation is
best left to the civil courts.”127
Nevertheless, as enacted, the new law contains a purpose clause,
wherein victims are addressed in a separate objective from that concerning
employees, customers, pensioners and shareholders.128 In its backgrounder,
the department of justice does not comment further, noting only that the
new law “could help result in faster compensation to victims and protect

122. Niko Resources, supra note 53 at para 21. See also Greg McArthur, “Canadian Firm to Admit
to Overseas Bribery: Lengthy RCMP Probe Ends with Niko Resources’ Guilty Plea Over Attempts to
Inuence Bangladeshi minister,” The Globe and Mail (24 June 2011) A1, online: The Globe and Mail
<www.theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/7MDR-7K34].
123. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.34(1)(h).
124. 2017 Discussion Paper, supra note 68 at 12.
125. What We Heard, supra note 69 at 6; see also ibid at 13.
126. Ibid at 14, 19.
127. Ibid at 20.
128. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at ss 715.31(e), (f).
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jobs of innocent employees and investments of innocent shareholders.”129
The word “victim” is, however, a dened term in Canadian criminal law.
Section 2 of the Criminal Code provides that a “victim means a person
against whom an offence has been committed, or is alleged to have been
committed, who has suffered, or is alleged to have suffered, physical
or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss as the result of
the commission or alleged commission of the offence.” The Code also
denes “complainant” as “the victim of an alleged offence.”130 When rst
introduced in 1999,131 the denition of victim simply read that a “victim
includes the victim of an alleged offence,” with this denition, according
to the then justice minister, Anne McLellan, purposely left open to let
common sense and the judgments of the courts decide who is a victim.132
It was also introduced so as to avoid the argument that there cannot be
a victim without, or until there is, a conviction.133 The Criminal Code
denition of “victim” was later expanded in 2015, with the end result
connecting victimhood with the suffering of harm, while also expanding
harm to include property damage and economic loss.134 This wording may
well suggest that shareholders might be considered victims in a case of
corporate economic crime, with the 2015 denition clearly intended by
parliamentarians to serve as a broad denition, capable of covering all
persons directly affected by an offence, even when an offence has not
been committed against them personally.135 The current denition also
appears to be exhaustive, with Part XXII.1 of the Code on “Remediation
Agreements” expressly incorporating the section 2 denition of victim
within its denitional section in section 715.3(1), while also adding the
extra proviso that the term also “includes any person outside Canada”
when dealing with corruption of foreign public ofcials offences.136
129. Department of Justice, “Backgrounder,” supra note 108. But see Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note
110.
130. Criminal Code, supra note 16, s 2.
131. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Victims of Crime) and Another Act in Consequence, SC
1999, c 25, s 1. A more expansive denition of victim could be found in the Criminal Code, supra
note 16 at s 722(4), but its application was tied to the provision of victim impact statements at the
sentencing or discharge phase.
132. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 36-1, No 134
(22 April 1999) at 1200 (Hon Anne McLellan).
133. Ibid; see also Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 36-1, No 72 (9
June 1999) (Catherine Kane, Counsel, Criminal Law Policy, Department of Justice).
134. Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, SC 2015, c 13, s 2.
135. “Bill C-32, An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain Acts,” 2nd
reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 72 (9 April 2014) at 1610 (Hon Peter MacKay); “Bill
C-32, An Act to enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and to amend certain Acts,” 3rd reading,
House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 176 (20 February 2015) at 1005 (Hon Peter MacKay).
136. Criminal Code, supra note 16 at s 715.3(1).
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II. The inevitability of economic consequences and shareholders as
victims
Corporations cannot go to jail. The accountability option available
upon conviction is a nancial penalty, which inevitably must have some
economic consequences for the corporation involved in order for the
penalty to serve as a deterrent. In the foreign corruption context, these nes
can be extensive, often ranging in the millions of dollars for the corporate
offender. Rolls-Royce Plc, for example, incurred a nancial penalty of
GBP £239-million for foreign bribery in 2017, with that ne to have been
higher, but for what was described by the English Crown Court as the
company’s “extraordinary” cooperation with prosecuting authorities.137
An order was also made for the disgorgement of prots in the amount of
GBP £258-million, and like SNC-Lavalin, Rolls-Royce employed some
50,000 people worldwide, with its reputation in the eld of engineering
motivating the court to conclude that it was “properly considered a
company of central importance to the United Kingdom.”138
These huge sums are then paid to the public accounts of the
governments of the prosecuting authority, with no obligation to pay
forward any of the funds to the government or people of the foreign
country affected. In some cases, compensation might also be available, as
might asset recovery and the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, although
it is often not easy to trace with sufcient precision the losses that result,
or the prots that were gained, from a complex scheme of foreign bribery.
Indeed, it is the very complexity of corporate crime that favours the use
of negotiated settlements, given the difculties in proving matters at trial,
with the obvious topics for negotiation being the amount of the ne to be
incurred and any credit or discount to be applied in recognition of corporate
cooperation and/or voluntary self-disclosure.139 It is also inevitable that
consideration will be given to the consequences of a conviction, with a
guilty plea, as distinct from a stayed prosecution, for foreign corruption
charges raising the prospect of debarment from consideration for future

137. Serious Fraud Ofce v Rolls Royce Plc, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 249 (Crown Court) at paras 2122.
138. Ibid at para 2; see also United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, News Release, “SFO Completes
£497.25m Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Rolls-Royce PLC” (17 January 2017), online:
<www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/KB3K-U369].
139. In England and Wales, the Sentencing Council’s recommended maximum discount of 30% for
a guilty plea has increased to 50% in corporate bribery cases settled through deferred prosecution
agreements. For a full discussion, see UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act, supra note 15 at paras
284-310.
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lucrative work. The impact of debarment has also been considered at the
judicial approval phase for a deferred prosecution agreement.140
There remains, however, the question of whether the shareholders
in a company should be considered victims or innocent third parties
particularly in the foreign corruption context where the benets of a
bribery arrangement may well have secured the protable work and an
increase in share value. The Grifths Energy International case provides
an illustrative example. In that case,141 Grifths Energy International
(GEI) had engaged in the bribery of the wife of the ambassador of Chad to
the United States and Canada, and the wife of the deputy chief of Chad’s
diplomatic mission, in return for assistance in securing a contract with the
Republic of Chad. The bribes, (a description contested by the individuals
involved),142 consisted of the payment of a USD $2 million consultancy fee
and the grant of four million shares in GEI at a price of $0.001 per share.
In January 2011, GEI secured the desired production-sharing contract with
Chad, and in February 2011, the company founded by the ambassador’s
wife received its payment of the USD $2 million fee. Six months later,
GEI underwent a change of management. During preparations to become
a publicly-traded company, the bribery arrangements were discovered,
leading to the company’s voluntary self-disclosure of wrongdoing to law
enforcement authorities in both Canada and the United States. In January
2013, a plea deal on foreign corruption charges was reached between GEI
and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, resulting in the payment
of a CAD $10.35 million ne. That deal saved the company, which later
changed its name to Caracal Energy, and by July 2013, had begun trading
shares on the London Stock Exchange.143 By mid-2014, Caracal Energy,
and its valuable prospects in Chad, had been acquired by the Anglo-Swiss
commodities and resources giant Glencore Xstrata Plc for GBP £807
million,144 leading to a surge in value for the company’s shareholders.145
140. Serious Fraud Ofce v Rolls Royce Plc, supra note 137 at paras 52-55.
141. R v Grifths Energy International Inc, supra note 53. The facts are also set out in detail in Serious
Fraud Ofce v Saleh, [2015] EWHC 2119 (QB) at paras 11-23 [Saleh (2015)]; Saleh v Director of
the Serious Fraud Ofce, [2017] EWCA Civ 18 at paras 6-21 [Saleh (2017)]; Serious Fraud Ofce v
Saleh, [2018] EWHC 1012 (QB) (BAILII) at paras 14-51 [Saleh (2018)].
142. See Bechir v Gowling Laeur Henderson LLP, 2017 ABQB 667 at paras 15-18.
143. The factual background can be found in Harrington, supra note 39 at 127-128.
144. Ashley Armstrong, “Glencore Gatecrashes Caracal Energy Deal with Rival £807m Cash Offer,”
The Telegraph (14 April 2014), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk> [perma.cc/7BSS-S593]; Alexis Flynn,
“Glencore Xstrata Buys Caracal Energy,” The Wall Street Journal (14 April 2014), online: <www.wsj.
com> [perma.cc/G3R3-JCA2]. Announced in April, the acquisition took place in July 2014. Glencore
had merged with Xstrata in 2013 and is now known simply as Glencore.
145. Neil Hume & Xan Rice, “Glencore Xstrata Buys Chad-Focussed Oil and Gas Group Caracal,”
Financial Times (14 April 2014), online: <www.ft.com/content/68960974-c3da-11e3-a8e0-
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Acquisition by the world’s largest mining company, with revenues in the
billions, also meant that at GBP £5.50 per share, the four million shares
provided as an bribe to the two wives were now worth an estimated GBP
£22 million.
Securing the forfeiture of these benets was not an easy task. A
forfeiture application was initiated in Canada, but later withdrawn, with the
chief federal prosecutor providing no reasons.146 In July 2014, the shares
were surrendered to the stock transfer agent handling the acquisition of
Caracel Energy by Glencore, and the proceeds of their sale were deposited
in an account with the Royal Bank of Scotland, leading to the involvement
of the leading British prosecutorial authority for matters of economic
crime, the Serious Fraud Ofce (SFO). Acting on its own initiative, and
in response to a US Department of Justice request, the SFO then took
the necessary steps to secure a property freezing order for the proceeds
of the sale.147 The wife of the deputy chief of mission, Ikram Mahamet
Saleh, then went to court in England to seek the release of a sum of GBP
£4.4 million, being the proceeds from the sale of the 800,000 shares she
had acquired in 2009 for CAD $800.148 She was unsuccessful, leading to
the alleged proceeds of crime from the Grifths Energy bribery scheme
being seized—not by the actions of the Canadian authorities, but by
British authorities,149 with the SFO having advertised its success in what
it calls the “Chad Oil case.”150 As for the shares held by the ambassador’s
wife, those became the subject of US forfeiture proceedings, with the US
authorities viewing the proceeds as traceable to conduct carried out when
the ambassador and his wife were stationed in the US.151
The SFO also deserves credit for its recognition of the overseas
victims of the crime and the general societal damage that arises in cases
of foreign bribery. There is, however, a risk in any foreign corruption case
that the foreign ofcials taking bribes are emblematic of a wider culture
of corruption and cronyism within the foreign state. For this reason, there
may be concerns in remitting funds to the government, with Chad, as a
00144feabdc0> [perma.cc/3M6J-X498].
146. As recorded in Saleh (2015), supra note 141 at paras 112-113.
147. Ibid at para 53.
148. Saleh (2017), supra note 141 at paras 2, 6.
149. Saleh (2018), supra note 141.
150. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, News Release, “SFO Recovers £4.4m from Corrupt
Diplomats in ‘Chad Oil’ Deal” (22 March 2018), online: <www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/RA3NNM2D].
151. United States, Department of Justice, Press Release, 14-1240, “Department of Justice Seeks
Recovery of Approximately $100,000 in Bribes Paid to Former Chad Ambassador” (7 November
2014), online: <www.justice.gov> [perma.cc/95EJ-7VTX].
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pertinent example, having faced criticism for using its oil revenues to
buy weapons rather than relieve poverty in the face of an agreement with
the World Bank that oil royalties be used for development purposes.152
Balancing these considerations, the SFO directed the funds seized in the
Chad Oil case to be transferred to the UK government’s Department for
International Development (DFID) for investment in projects that “will
benet the poorest in Chad.”153
This example of creative sentencing parallels two other efforts where
the SFO has facilitated the transfer back of conscated funds for the benet
of foreign victims of foreign bribery. Using the monies arising from the
conviction of the security printing rm, Smith and Ouzman Ltd., the SFO
procured several new ambulances to service hospitals in Kenya, and it
used its very rst deferred prosecution agreement with Standard Bank Plc
(now known as ICBC Standard Bank Plc) to direct GBP £4.9 million to the
government of Tanzania.154 In a 2018 speech at an international symposium
on economic crime delivered by the head of the SFO’s Proceeds of Crime
and International Assistance Division, Elizabeth Baker made clear the
SFO’s position that “[a]ll economic crime has victims,” even if “[t]heir
identication may be more elusive.”155 She went on to state that “the ideal
outcome, where-ever it is possible, is for the money secured through asset
recovery to be returned to victims, using that term in its widest sense.”156
In supporting her argument with examples, she drew upon the cases of
Chad Oil and Smith and Ouzman Ltd.
III. Comparative experience from the United Kingdom and Australia
Law enforcement authorities in the UK have also entered into an agreement
to establish “a common framework to identify cases where compensation
is appropriate” for victims of economic crime overseas and to “act swiftly
in those cases to return funds to the affected countries, companies or
152. See further Annalisa M Leibold, “Aligning Incentives for Development: The World Bank and the
Chad-Cameron Oil Pipeline” (2011) 36:1 Yale J Intl L 167-206.
153. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, News Release, supra note 150. See also Harrington,
supra note 39 at 134, for the suggestion that “a seizing state may consider using the funds to support
development projects and charities in the foreign state that have been vetted by its own development
agency.”
154. These developments are highlighted by the SFO, supra note 150. Case information concerning
Smith and Ouzman Ltd is available from the Serious Fraud Ofce at <www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/smithouzman-ltd/> [perma.cc/57PN-J9CW]. Case information concerning Standard Bank Plc is available
from the Serious Fraud Ofce at <www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/standard-bank-plc/> [perma.cc/MU2TNGL9].
155. Elizabeth Baker, “All Economic Crime has Victims” (Paper delivered at the Cambridge
International Symposium on Economic Crime, Cambridge, 6 September 2018), online: Serious Fraud
Ofce <www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/W3AK-2F3G].
156. Ibid.
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people.”157 The agreement concerns the Crown Prosecution Service, the
National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Ofce. Launched as part of
the UK’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2017–2022, the three departments
have adopted a set of “General Principles” that make clear their “aim to
ensure that overseas victims of bribery, corruption and economic crime,
are able to benet from asset recovery proceedings and compensation
orders made in England and Wales,” with these victims to include
“affected states, organizations and individuals.”158 The over-arching
strategy document also calls upon the UK to support other countries “to
deliver their commitment to develop their own principles and continue to
raise awareness internationally with the aim of achieving a consensus that
overseas victims should benet from the positive outcomes of bribery and
corruption cases.”159
It is worth drawing attention to this development since Canada has
opted for the English model of deferred prosecution agreements. There are
two kinds of legal regimes that provide for deferred prosecution agreements.
The United States has a policy-based regime, driven by the discretion of a
prosecutor or a Securities and Exchange Commission ofcial,160 and with a
fairly limited role for the courts,161 although legislation has been proposed
since 2009 to provide for the issuance of public written guidelines.162
The impetus for the US policy favouring the use of deferred prosecution
agreements to address the corporate commission of economic crime has
been widely attributed to the 2002 criminal conviction of the now-defunct
157. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, News Release, “New Joint Principles Published to
Compensate Victims of Economic Crime Overseas” (1 June 2018), online: <https://www.sfo.gov.
uk/2018/06/01/new-joint-principles-published-to-compensate-victims-of-economic-crime-overseas/>
[perma.cc/Y2T5-S6JK].
158. United Kingdom, Crown Prosecution Service, “General Principles to Compensate Overseas
Victims (Including Affected States) in Bribery, Corruption and Economic Crimes Cases” (December
2017), online: Crown Prosecution Service <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/les/documents/
publications/general-Principles-to-compensate-overseas-victims-December-2017.pdf>
[perma.cc/
B4FE-QLNR].
159. United Kingdom Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017–2020 (2017), art 6.10, online (pdf): Government
of the United Kingdom <assets.publishing.service.gov.uk> [perma.cc/ADP2-BPKC].
160. On the evolution of US policy towards the use of deferred prosecution agreements to address
the corporate commission of foreign corruption, see Mike Koehler, “Measuring the Impact of NonProsecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement”
(2015) 49:2 UC Davis L Rev 497.
161. For appellate afrmation of a limited judicial role in reviewing the terms of a US deferred
prosecution agreement, see United States v Fokker Services BV, 818 F (3d) 733 at 744-745 (DC Cir
2016). See also United States of America v HSBC Bank USA, NA, 863 F (3d) 125 (2d Cir 2017).
162. Entitled the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, the legislation has not been enacted into
law. A recent effort was introduced in 2018 by US Senator Elizabeth Warren that would also mandate
judicial oversight. See further Peter R Reilly, “Sweetheart Deals, Deferred Prosecution, and Making
a Mockery of the Criminal Justice System: US Corporate DPAs Rejected on Many Fronts” (2018) 50
Ariz St LJ 113 at 1160-1163.
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agreement was “a creature unknown to English law,” as explained in a
recent parliamentary review of the scheme.172 English deferred prosecution
agreements are also clearly intended to be discretionary tools, with only
the director of public prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud
Ofce having the power to authorize their negotiation with corporations,
partnerships and unincorporated associations, but never individuals, in
relation to fraud, bribery and other economic crimes.173 The courts have a
role in approving and overseeing such agreements, and their terms are made
public. The process and application criteria has also been made public,
as is the Code of Practice describing how prosecutors will use this new
tool.174 Criminal prosecution, however, continues to serve as a preferred
course of action, with the entire scheme made subject to an overarching
principle that deferred prosecution agreements are only offered in specic
circumstances, and in the interests of justice, based on an assessment of
the evidence and the public interest.175 To date, four agreements have
been concluded, with these agreements concerning Standard Bank
(2015), Rolls Royce (2017), Tesco (2017), and a fourth company known
as XYZ because it cannot be named until related criminal proceedings
are concluded.176 The cases of Standard Bank, Rolls Royce, and XYZ are
concerned with bribery offences, while the Tesco case involved charges of
false accounting practices.
As for victims, the British legislation indicates that a deferred
prosecution agreement can include an obligation “to compensate victims”
or “to donate money to a charity or other third party.”177 Indeed, in the
rst agreement concluded under the new scheme, involving an indictment
against Standard Bank Plc for failing to prevent associated persons from
committing bribery, a term was included for the payment of compensation
with interest to the government of Tanzania in the amount of USD $7
million, in addition to the payment of a USD $16.8 million penalty,
the disgorgement of prots in the amount of USD $8.6 million, and
the payment of GBP £330,000 for the costs of the investigation.178 The
(Commencement No 8) Order 2014 (UK), SI 2014/258.
172. See UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act, supra note 15 at 69.
173. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, supra note 166, Schedule 17, para 3.
174. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce and Crown Prosecution Service, “Deferred Prosecution
Agreements: Code of Practice” (11 February 2014), online: Crown Prosecution Service <https://www.
cps.gov.uk/sites/default/les/documents/publications/dpa_cop.pdf> [perma.cc/LQL5-VDBS].
175. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, supra note 166, Schedule 17 at ss 7(1)(a), 8(1)(a), 10(2)(a).
176. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements” (undated),
online: <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecutionagreements/> [perma.cc/LBU8-QD8S].
177. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, supra note 166, Schedule 17 at ss 5(3)(b)-(c).
178. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, News Release, “UK’s First Deferred Prosecution

274 The Dalhousie Law Journal

agreement lasted for three years and when it expired on 30 November
2018, the SFO issued a statement expressly conrming that the terms were
met, with the payment of compensation to Tanzania made in May 2016.
The SFO has also announced that it has been working with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofce, the Department of International Development and
HM Treasury, as well as other UK organizations, “to develop a process for
making similar compensation payments and other nancial settlements to
affected states in foreign bribery and international corruption cases safely
and transparently.”179
The process of judicial approval for deferred prosecution agreements
has also led to judicial guidance from the English courts with respect
to providing compensation for victims. In his preliminary judgment
concerning Standard Bank Plc, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division,
Sir Brian Leveson, made clear that in relation to corporate offenders,
priority should be given to the payment of compensation to victims over
nes.180 However, the payment of compensation relies on an ability to
positively identify an entity or person as a victim, as the English court has
made clear in relation to the deferred prosecution agreements for XYZ and
Rolls Royce.181 Sentencing guidelines and their associated jurisprudence
have also made clear that compensation is for “clear and simple cases” and
“there is no jurisdiction to make an order where there are real issues as to
whether those to benet have suffered any, and if so, what loss.”182 As a
result, those who perpetrate the most complex foreign bribery schemes,
perhaps involving multiple intermediaries, make it impossible to identify
a quantiable loss arising from the criminal conduct, and can avoid having
to pay compensation precisely because of that complexity.
Australia, meanwhile, introduced the possibility of deferred
prosecution agreements in December 2017,183 following a more extensive
consultation process than that used in Canada. In March 2016, the
attorney-general’s department released a discussion paper on the possible

Agreement, between the SFO and Standard Bank, Successfully Ends” (30 November 2018), online:
<www.sfo.gov.uk> [perma.cc/LBU8-QD8S].
179. United Kingdom, Serious Fraud Ofce, “Case Information: Standard Bank Plc” (last updated
3 September 2019), online: <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/standard-bank-plc/> [perma.cc/KBJ6JNND].
180. Serious Fraud Ofce v Standard Bank Plc, [2015] 11 WLUK 804 (Crown Court) at para 39.
181. Serious Fraud Ofce v XYZ Ltd, [2016] 7 WLUK 220 (Crown Court) at para 20; Serious Fraud
Ofce v Rolls Royce Plc, supra note 137 at paras 81-84.
182. Serious Fraud Ofce v Rolls Royce Plc, supra note 181 at para 81.
183. Australia, Commonwealth Parliament, Parliamentary Library Bills Digest, Crimes Legislation
Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crimes) Bill 2017 (Cth), by Cat Barker & Monica Biddington
(2017) (introduced and read a rst time).
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introduction of a scheme for deferred prosecution agreements,184 and then
in March 2017, the department initiated a second consultation for views
on the law to be proposed.185 Then, after the relevant bill was introduced
in parliament, a further consultation was undertaken with respect to a
Code of Practice, with a draft being published in May 2018.186 However,
contrary to the suggestion made in the ethics commissioner’s report,187
Australia’s scheme is not yet in place. The bill lapsed with the dissolution
of the Commonwealth Parliament for a general election in mid-2019.
Assuming the law will be enacted in the near future, the Australian
scheme intends to offer a corporation the deferment of a prosecution on
foreign bribery and corruption charges, among other serious corporate
crimes, in return for an obligation of cooperation with other investigations,
the payment of a nancial penalty, and the implementation of a program
to improve compliance through ongoing monitoring. The terms of
the agreement must be approved by a retired judge, due to Australian
constitutional concerns having posed an obstacle to the use of a sitting
judge. If the agreement is approved, no criminal proceedings are to be
commenced, making the Australian scheme more akin to a non-prosecution
agreement, with criminal proceedings commenced if the agreement is
breached.188 During the consultation process, it was also suggested that
the introduction of a deferred prosecution agreement scheme will “help
to compensate victims of corporate crime,”189 with the attorney-general’s
department having come to the view that “victim restitution is a key
feature of the US and UK schemes.”190 The proposed Australian scheme
also follows the lead of the English scheme by providing for the payment
of a donation to a charity or third party as an obligation within an approved
agreement.

184. Australia, Commonwealth Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements: Public Consultation (March 2016) [Australia 2016 Discussion Paper].
185. Australia, Commonwealth Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Public
Consultation: Proposed Model for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement Scheme in Australia (March
2017), online: Government of Australia <www.ag.gov.au> [perma.cc/YC8U-SGRS].
186. Australia, Commonwealth Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Deferred Prosecution
Agreement Scheme Code of Practice: Consultation Draft (May 2018), online (pdf): Government of
Australia <www.ag.gov.au> [perma.cc/DMH8-UZ6T].
187. Trudeau II Report, supra note 2 at para 25.
188. This point is made in a critique of the proposed Australian scheme in Liz Campbell, “Trying
Corporate Actors—Why Not Prosecute?” (8 February 2019) at 17, online: Social Sciences Research
Network <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332134> [perma.cc/X64E-V4UE].
189. Australia 2016 Discussion Paper, supra note 184 at 3.
190. Ibid at 20.
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IV. Creating a remediation fund similar to the Environmental Damages
Fund
One last option for future consideration is the creation of a designated fund
to which some portion of the penalties for foreign corruption could be
directed to provide nancial support for development assistance projects
aimed at the remediation of the general societal impact of foreign bribery.
Such a fund could use the federally-created Environmental Damages Fund
(EDF) as a model and precedent.191 Established in 1995, not by statute or
regulation, but by a Treasury Board decision,192 and administered by the
federal department of the environment (known colloquially as Environment
and Climate Change Canada),193 the EDF serves as a concrete expression
of the polluter-pays principle in international environmental law, whereby
those who pollute are required to pay for the economic, environmental
and social consequences of their activities.194 The EDF is a “specied
purpose account” within the accounts of Canada,195 into which are
deposited monies obtained from court orders, negotiated settlements and
voluntary payments relating to the commission of environmental offences
under federal statutes such as the Canadian Environmental Protection Act,
1999.196 Monies can also be directed to the EDF from what are called
Environmental Protection Alternative Measures (EPAMs), which stand
as an environmental law equivalent to the above-discussed remediation
agreements for economic crimes.197 Payments have also been directed to
the EDF in cases where direct damage has been difcult to identify, as
with the illegal importation of an ozone-depleting substance, and where

191. See generally “Environmental Damages Fund” (15 November 2018), online: Government of
Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-funding/
programs/environmental-damages-fund.html> [perma.cc/9S5N-6E9J].
192. Harry J Wruck, “The Federal Environmental Damages Fund” (2004) 62:2 Advocate 217 at 221.
For the legal authority, see the Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11.
193. Department of the Environment Act, RSC 1985, c E-10.
194. See Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/
CONF.151/26 (Vol I) at Annex I (1992); see also Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell,
International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 322-326.
The Supreme Court of Canada has conrmed that “the principle has become rmly entrenched in
environmental law in Canada”: Imperial Oil v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at
paras 23-24.
195. Government of Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, “Directive on Accounting Standards: GC
4100 Specied Purpose Accounts” (1 April 2017), online: <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.
aspx?id=32524> [perma.cc/S5LL-VGUK].
196. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33.
197. See further Government of Canada, Environment Canada, “Environmental Protection:
Alternatives to Legal Prosecution” (28 November 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/
environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-act-registry/enforcementcompliance/alternatives-legal-prosecution.html> [perma.cc/AYV7-6A2E].
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harm is assumed to ow from an illegality committed in a foreign state, as
with the importation of elephant ivory into Canada.198
The EDF assists with remediation through the provision of awards
in support of projects aimed at environmental rehabilitation and wildlife
conservation, with applications made by non-governmental organizations,
universities and academic institutions, Indigenous organizations, and
provincial, territorial and municipal governments. According to a 2014
evaluation, the EDF had allocated or committed over CAD $4.8 million
since 1998, and funded 201 projects across Canada.199 To receive funding,
a proposed project must focus on one or more of the Fund’s designated
priority areas, being environmental restoration, environmental quality
improvement, research and development, and education and awareness.
Projects which focus on the geographic region where the offence occurred
are also given priority, with the EDF also obliged to respect any restrictions
imposed by the courts concerning the monies. Sub-accounts are established
within the EDF to meet any conditions specied by a court and to allocate
monies to address particular incidents. The terms of the EDF also spell out
what is ineligible for support, and they require that funded projects make
use of performance indicators to evaluate outcomes. Projects are selected
for funding by department experts through an evaluation process that is
similar to that used for the allocation of research grants and scholarships
from public funds.
By its terms, the EDF cannot be used to fund projects outside of
Canada. This restriction is the choice of the fund’s creators, and does
not bar the creation of a similar fund to support development assistance
projects overseas, using a portion of the nancial penalties paid by
Canadian companies (and possibly, individuals) for the commission
of foreign bribery. Instead of requirements to demonstrate scientic
feasibility, the terms of this proposed development assistance fund could
require applicants to work with Canada’s international development
ministry,200 so as to minimize the risk of monies being injected back into
corrupt government schemes, and in partnership with a local community
in the foreign country, so as to ensure that the latter has a role in designing
198. See Wruck, supra note 192 at 229.
199. Government of Canada, Environment Canada, Audit and Evaluation Branch, Evaluation of
the Environmental Damages Fund: Final Report (October 2014) at i, online (pdf): <https://www.
ec.gc.ca/ae-ve/23D3C410-CDE9-46F9-AD2E-055551B883FE/Evaluation%20of%20the%20
Environmental%20Damages%20Fund%20(EDF).pdf> [perma.cc/F6VM-SU3Y].
200. With statutory responsibilities for international development, poverty reduction and humanitarian
assistance, Canada’s Minister for International Development operates within the Department of
Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development (known colloquially as Global Affairs Canada).
See Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, SC 2013, c 33, s 174 at s 4.
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and implementing the remediation project. Indeed, in light of Canada’s
experience with the EDF, the larger obstacle to overcome may be the need
for publicity about this sentencing option, with greater awareness needed
among both lawyers and judges so to ensure that some portion of the
penalties are diverted to such a fund.201
Conclusion
There needs to be greater clarity as to the place for victims within the
criminal law scheme for addressing the corruption of foreign public
ofcials, whether the crime is committed by corporations or individuals.
Given the crime’s inherent transnational nature, there may well be victims
in both Canada and overseas, with Canada’s justice system having long
accepted that corruption is neither harmless nor victimless. Since the
mid-1980s, greater attention has also been paid to the impact of crime on
victims, leading to the adoption of an international declaration of basic
principles in 1985.202 According to this declaration, victims of crime are
entitled “to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the
harm that they have suffered,” and “offenders…should, where appropriate,
make fair restitution to victims.”203 To give effect to the 1985 declaration,
states are encouraged to cooperate with each other in such matters as
“the pursuit of offenders” and “the seizure of their assets, to be used for
restitution to the victim.”204 The UK’s Serious Fraud Ofce appears to
be heeding this call in the corruption context, having developed public
statements of principle that recognize the need to use the millions paid
in nes to assist overseas victims, even if its initial efforts to put these
principles into practice through the provision of ambulances for Kenya
may seem so random as to provide little precedential guidance.205
There remains, however, the difcult issue of dening a victim in the
foreign corruption context, with the SNC-Lavalin affair having repeatedly
raised issues of victimhood in public discussions.206 The victims most often

201. See further Government of Canada, Environment Canada, Audit and Evaluation Branch,
Evaluation of the Environmental Damages Fund (July 2009), online: <https://www.ec.gc.ca/ae-ve/
default.asp?lang=En&n=4DBC464A-1> [perma.cc/BP8V-XHTL]; Evaluation of the Environmental
Damages Fund: Final Report, supra note 199.
202. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN GA Res
40/34, UN Doc A/RES/40/34 (1985) at para 1 [Victims of Crime Declaration].
203. Ibid, Annex at paras 4, 8.
204. Ibid at para 4(h).
205. I remain grateful to Professor Cecily Rose of Leiden University for this insight.
206. There has been no mention in the media coverage concerning the SNC-Lavalin plea deal reached
in December 2019 as to whether the ne of CAD $280-million includes some form of payment for
victims. SNC-Lavalin had earlier indicated a “willingness to provide further information” concerning
the negotiation of reparations to victims: SNC-Lavalin v Canada 2019, supra note 17 at para 13.
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mentioned were the company’s employees, pensioners and suppliers, as
well as its shareholders and investors. Under the 1985 UN Declaration,
victims are dened as “persons who, individually or collectively, have
suffered harm,” with the Declaration also making clear that “a person may
be considered a victim…regardless of whether the perpetrator is identied,
apprehended, prosecuted or convicted.”207 However, for victim redress to
be secured through compensation or restitution, specicity is needed as to
a victim’s identity and the quantication of their loss, with a causal link
to be established between the victim and the criminal conduct. Given the
difculty in establishing this degree of specicity, another option may be
to abandon any denitional effort, and instead provide for victim redress
in foreign corruption cases through efforts of a collective nature, aimed
at addressing general societal needs, with the exibility of negotiated
agreements, whether plea deals or remediation agreements, offering the
best prospects for securing some diversion of the nes to be paid by
corporate wrongdoers.
For many, society as a whole, or society as a whole within the
foreign state, is seen as the victim in a foreign corruption case, with the
development imperative for tackling foreign bribery and corruption having
been embraced by the Supreme Court of Canada in the opening words of
its judgment in World Bank Group v Wallace.208 Many may also recognize
grand corruption’s wider connection to the breakdown of the rule of
law and the sense of impunity that can contribute to the commission of
international crimes, with Libya being a cogent example. For this reason,
victim redress in the form of redirecting some of the millions paid in
corporate nes to an appropriate charity or an international development
agency for the provision of public services in the affected foreign country
is the best route forward, with the general principles on compensating
the overseas victims of economic crime adopted by the law enforcement
authorities in England and Wales offering a model for Canada to consider
further.209 The time is also ripe for a parliamentary review of the CFPOA,
with Canada’s peer jurisdictions having already engaged in a parliamentary
review of their Act’s record of success and failings.210 In addition,
Canada’s implementation of its obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, including article 5, is scheduled for a peer review before the

207. Victims of Crime Declaration, supra note 202, Annex at paras 1 & 2.
208. World Bank Group v Wallace, supra note 30 at para 1.
209. See United Kingdom, Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 158.
210. Australia, Commonwealth Parliament, Senate, Economics References Committee, Foreign
Bribery (March 2018) (Chair: Chris Ketter); UK Select Committee on the Bribery Act, supra note 15.
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OECD Working Group on Bribery in 2020.211 A review of the CFPOA, as
now amended by the remediation agreement scheme, could also consider
further the idea of creating a corruption remediation and development
assistance fund, akin to Canada’s Environmental Damages Fund, for the
collection and distribution of a portion of the nancial penalties paid in
settlement of foreign corruption charges to provide support for worthy
projects.

211. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Monitoring Schedule: December 2016–June 2024, (undated),
online (pdf): <www.oecd.org> [perma.cc/55RD-QHDH]. Launched at the OECD Anti-Bribery
Ministerial Meeting held in Paris on 18 March 2016, the fourth phase of the Convention’s peer review
monitoring process aims to focus on enforcement efforts and results.

